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THE HARD PROBLEM 
MAURICE BLOCH 
 
Soul dust: the magic of consciousness BY NICHOLAS HUMPHREY 
This is an extraordinary book as it attempts to explain all the most distinctive things about 
human beings in a few hundred pages. It is written by a swashbuckling character who clearly 
does not hesitate to take up the most daring challenges. Perhaps such characterisation will 
be enough to put off the majority of social and cultural anthropologists who have grown 
weary of grand generalisations about our species made by scholars from the natural 
sciences who have very little understanding of why our subject has abandoned making such 
grandiose pronouncements. So often these proposals seem mere repeats of older theories 
which have subsequently been found wanting for reasons of which their new advocates are 
unaware. At least in this case such condemnation would be somewhat unfair as it is clear 
that the author is well acquainted with what many anthropologists write and have written and 
he is not unsympathetic as so many natural scientists are. Another reason why 
anthropologists might reject this book out of hand is less admirable; it may simply be a 
manifestation of the sad theoretical timidity which has recently characterised much of the 
subject. 
Whatever the causes for reluctance, such dismissal would be a pity. The book is written in a 
fun manner which will both delight and annoy but will never bore. I believe the discussion it 
contains, or at least parts of it, can prove excitingly thought provoking to all practitioners of 
social and cultural anthropology. What I therefore say to my anthropological colleagues is: 
“Prepare to be infuriated but read the book all the same”. 
Darwinian evolutionary theory frames the thesis. The argument is about the vexed question 
of the nature of human consciousness and what it implies. It thus attempts to explain the 
least obviously useful aspects of human beings as adaptations which account for their 
presence and survival. This however is not the usual ignorant reductionist stuff that we have 
all come to fear. 
 
 
  
Probably explaining or describing consciousness is a task that most anthropologists consider 
to be beyond them but this is also the case for many scholars who come from disciplines 
such as philosophy, psychology or neurology and who might have been expected to have a 
go at telling us what consciousness is and even perhaps how it has come about. Indeed, 
many have recently attempted theories concerning the nature of consciousness. 
Nonetheless the most well known scholars who write on the subject seem more intent on 
recommending to others that they should not waste their time on such difficult questions. For 
example Nagel told us that we are such a long way from even understanding what we are 
talking about that we should not even start and Searle believed he had explained why any 
naturalist account of consciousness is impossible.  Although Humphrey reiterates some of 
these pessimistic arguments he nonetheless believes that his evolutionary approach can 
overcome them. 
Some of what he tells us is new, some of what he tells he has told us before, and some 
ideas are borrowed from others and these are always scrupulously acknowledged. As a 
starting point he defines consciousness not so much analytically as by giving us an 
evolutionary history of human consciousness which somehow makes the traditional despair 
about the subject less oppressive. First of all there was sensation which involved an 
automatic reaction to the environment on the part of the organism. Such reaction is widely 
shared in the living world as even plants react to what they come in contact with. Then there 
is a further step which involves what he calls sentition, that is the quasi centralisation of 
knowledge of the interaction with the outside world on the part of the organism. With 
sentition when a brick drops on your toe the pain is created in the brain even though we 
believe it is located in the foot. This looping and re-representation of the interaction with the 
world in the central nervous system where it is interpreted as entity occurring at the locus of 
interaction is for Humphrey the essential first step towards proper consciousness. This 
involves seeing oneself as if from the outside, as an actor on some sort of stage that one is 
watching. Such a formulation of the “Cartesian theatre” has often been criticised, in particular 
by Humphrey’s one time co-author Daniel Dennett, but he carries on regardless. For the 
“observed actor” to be created, various sentitions have to be united so that the full conscious 
self can be realised. A key element for the possibility of this creation is what Humphrey, 
following others, calls the thickening of time. The point is that the present has no durability 
and so the mind has to give a degree of illusory stability to the representation of its 
interaction with the outside world before this can become an object of, and for, reflection. 
At this stage, and before looking somewhat more critically at what the argument involves, it 
is worth pausing to reflect why a discussion of the hard question of what is consciousness is 
at all important for the anthropologist or the ethnographer. The reason, I would argue, is 
simply this: if ethnographers, in Malinowski’s famous phrase, attempt to communicate “the 
native’s point of view” we need to be somewhat clear about what it is to have “a point of 
view”. Discussions of this fundamental question are, as far as I know, rare or non existent in 
social or cultural anthropology. What is that phenomenon that we are trying to convey? Is it 
what the people studied express or are we talking about something much less explicit but 
more fundamental; people’s consciousness of themselves in an environment which includes 
others assumed to be conscious. If that is the case anthropologists cannot avoid the hard 
question. We are thrown back on the problem of what consciousness is and of what it is to 
be aware of one self or to be a person in the world. Furthermore, since anthropologists are 
not professional writers of autobiographies we need to reflect on how we can possibly 
access other people’s consciousness or selves or persons etc. For such a reflection, and as 
a warning of the difficulties involved, anthropologists will benefit from a book such as this. In 
any case, as they read on, they will soon feel more at home since the discussion of the 
nature of consciousness is rapidly followed by an exploration into areas with which 
anthropologists and ethnographers are more familiar. 
Humphrey’s characterisation of consciousness as a theatre which represents oneself to 
oneself as an actor among other actors leads him to endorse a view which has been 
discussed by a number of cognitive psychologists such as Paul Bloom and anthropologists 
such as Rita Astuti and Alfred Gell: that humans are natural mind/body dualists. This, argues 
Humphrey, is because the creation of oneself for oneself, which evolution has produced in 
humans, creates the mind as a represented entity distinct from the body. This, he tells us, 
can be given the more familiar label of the “soul”. Probably the choice of this word is 
intended in part to provocatively horrify Humphrey’s psychological colleagues who will not 
have completely forgotten the behaviourists’ denunciations of the “ghost in the machine”, but 
it also enables him to link his discussion to other literatures less often present in technical 
discussions concerning the mind in cognitive science. Anthropologists may be pleased or 
appalled by Humphreys’ nod of approval to Tylor’s animist theories, which, although a little 
revived in recent ethnographic literature, seem fairly dead in their original form. Not so here 
but there are more surprises in Humphrey’s catholic embrace. References to Tylor and 
Marilyn Strathern are accompanied by the evocation of poets such as Gerald Manley 
Hopkins, Coleridge or Philip Larkin, artists such as Kandinsky and writers such as 
Galsworthy and A.A. Milne. These, it must be admitted, do not often find themselves in the 
company of Jerry Fodor, Lionel Penrose, V.S. Ramachandran or F.J. Odling-Smee. 
This talk about “soul” and quotations from poems is not a question of mere added frills 
intended to seduce the non specialist reader so that they pick up a book that might, from the 
outside, be believed to be an austere contribution to cognitive science. Poetry, literature and 
even ethnography form the core of the argument of the book. According to Humphrey the 
emergence of human consciousness has forced human beings to reflect philosophically and 
artistically on the meaning of their lives and of the soul and at the same time to create 
imaginative systems. A simplified version of Humphrey’s story would go something like the 
following. With an objectified representation of the self/soul as an exterior object came the 
realisation that one will die. This fact is so depressing that there would be little reason not to 
commit suicide on the spot. However, consciousness has enabled us to enjoy life and 
beauty and to create all sorts of ideas about these things; hence poetry and literature. It has 
enabled us to place our lives in social systems within which we distribute ourselves and thus 
project our distributed selves in systems which overcome the limits of individual lives and 
give us a feeling of some sort of immortality. Consciousness has, in this way, given us the 
potential to create mental and material environments which encourage us not to give up and 
to reproduce our genes and ensure that our offsprings, or the offsprings of close relatives, 
will reach maturity so that they too will reproduce. Beliefs in the soul, beauty and literature 
increase our Darwinian fitness! 
All this remains a little vague but the idea is obviously quite attractive. Those of us who enjoy 
poetry (Humphrey quotes two of my favourite poems), music, philosophy and video games 
should not anymore be ashamed of wasting our evolutionary potential in pointless and 
therefore evolutionarily harmful side lines which, if they should take ever more time and 
energy, would lead to the end of our species, rather like bread and circuses are said to have 
led to the collapse of the Roman empire. John Milton, Woody Allen, Rainer Maria Rilke and 
David Hume, not to mention the makers of Star Wars, are all doing, or have done, their bit 
for increasing the prospects of our DNA. We need not consider their work as mere frivolity; it 
is all about contributing to the evolutionary process. Religion, of which evolutionary inclined 
scientists tend to disapprove, is really part and parcel of the general human adaptation to 
enjoy beauty and to overcome death; hence it is right for Darwinist Humphrey to employ the 
word soul and to like social and cultural anthropology and poetry. 
Nonetheless I personally suspect that all this good will, light and beauty may be somewhat 
misleading and this for a reason which has to do with an aspect of the original problem of the 
definition of consciousness. The poets, philosophers, and theologians summoned by 
Humphrey are all, if I may misquote Wordsworth, recollecting about consciousness in 
tranquillity. The authors quoted are trying to evoke what they feel is somehow there, but 
which they also acknowledge, like some of the cognitive scientists, they find nearly 
impossible to reach. They thus produce meta discourses as distant from their target as 
metaphysics is to physics. In any case their purpose in producing these works or in creating 
and organising religion is quite different to that of the blind watchmaker. We may accept that 
consciousness and an instinctive dualism leads humans to create and operate complex 
social and cultural systems but this does not mean that the theories and institutions 
produced in this way offer transparent guides to the nature of the psychological or social 
phenomena in themselves. I believe anthropologists have often mistaken occasional 
narratives, which may be produced by poets, artists and philosophers, as well as by their 
informants, to be accounts of the normally implicit business of being a conscious actor in a 
world of conscious actors. The production of such narratives is motivated by quite different 
intentions and for different purposes. I am not sure that these types of activities have a direct 
relation to the flow of consciousness as it occurs in our mental and social life, or that they 
can directly guide us towards their evolutionary implications. Theoreticians of 
consciousness, as Humphrey notes, find pinning down what is involved terribly hard, partly 
because it is so difficult to consciously imagine what it is to be without consciousness and 
partly because whatever it is, is so totally implicit. The ready made answers of artists and 
religion make the problem seem much too easy by providing quick, beautiful but shallow 
answers. I rather doubt these are helpful in advancing our understanding of the hard 
problem of consciousness. 
 
